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Abstract—Data provenance strives for explaining how the
computation was performed by recording a trace of the
execution. The provenance trace is useful across a wide-
range of workflows to improve the dependability, security,
and efficiency of software systems.
In this paper, we present INSPECTOR, a POSIX-compliant
data provenance library for shared-memory multithreaded
programs. The INSPECTOR library is completely transparent
and easy to use: it can be used as a replacement for the
pthreads library by a simple exchange of libraries linked,
without even recompiling the application code.
To achieve this result, we present a parallel provenance
algorithm that records control, data, and schedule depen-
dencies using a Concurrent Provenance Graph (CPG). We
implemented our algorithm to operate at the compiled
binary code level by leveraging a combination of OS-specific
mechanisms, and recently released Intel PT ISA extensions as
part of the Broadwell micro-architecture. Our evaluation on
a multicore platform using applications from multithreaded
benchmarks suites (PARSEC and Phoenix) shows reasonable
provenance overheads for a majority of applications.
Lastly, we briefly describe three case-studies where the
generic interface exported by INSPECTOR is being used
to improve the dependability, security, and efficiency of
systems. The INSPECTOR library is publicly available for
further use in a wide range of other provenance workflows.
I. INTRODUCTION
A data provenance-aware system gathers and reports
the lineage of execution. This allows the user to track,
and understand, how the computation was performed.
The provenance trace is useful for a wide-range of
workflows to improve the dependability, security, and
efficiency of software systems; including, program de-
bugging [17], state machine replication [19], compiler op-
timizations [20], incremental computation [8], program
slicing [34], memory management [25], and dynamic
information flow tracking [37], etc.
More specifically, the data provenance trace provides
an explicit intermediate program representation record-
ing control and data dependencies for a program exe-
cution. Many existing systems provide support for data
provenance (details in §IX); however, most existing so-
lutions target sequential programs (or at the granularity
of the entire process), while others that do support
parallelism rely on restrictive application-specific pro-
gramming model. As a result, the existing solutions
have limited adoption in practice for the general shared-
memory multithreaded programs.
In this paper, we propose an operating systems-based
approach to data provenance for multithreaded pro-
grams. More specifically, we have the following three
main design goals:
• Transparency: To support unmodified
multithreaded programs without requiring any
code changes to existing applications.
• Generality: To support the general shared-memory
programming model with the full range of synchro-
nization primitives in the POSIX API.
• Efficiency: To impose low overheads by designing
the underlying provenance algorithm to be parallel
as well so that it does not limit the available appli-
cation parallelism.
To achieve these goals, we present INSPECTOR, a data
provenance library for multithreaded programs. We im-
plemented INSPECTOR as a dynamically linkable shared
library. To run a program using INSPECTOR, the user just
needs to preload the INSPECTOR library, and then, run
the program as usual. Thus, our library supports existing
binaries without any code changes or re-compilation.
The library exports the provenance information to the
perf utility as an extended interface.
To run a program using INSPECTOR, the user just
needs to preload the INSPECTOR library by using the
environment variable LD_PRELOAD or -rdynamic flag,
and then, run the program as usual.
Our high level approach is based on recording data,
control, and schedule dependencies in a computation
by constructing a Concurrent Provenance Graph (CPG).
The CPG tracks the input data to a program, all sub-
computations (a sub-computation is a unit of the compu-
tation), the data flow between sub-computations, intra-
thread control flow, and inter-thread schedule dependen-
cies for the multithreaded execution.
In this paper, we present a parallel algorithm to build
the CPG. Our algorithm leverages the Release Con-
sistency (RC) memory model [18] to efficiently record
the inter-thread data and schedule dependencies in a
completely decentralized manner. We implemented our
algorithm as a dynamically linkable shared library by
leveraging process-level isolation, MMU-assisted mem-
ory tracking, and Intel PT ISA extensions, released re-
cently as part of the Broadwell micro-architecture. Fur-
thermore, we extended the library to support a consis-
tent snapshot facility, where the user can analyze the
provenance on-the-fly while the program is still running.
In particular, we make the following contributions:
• We present a parallel algorithm for data provenance
for multithreaded programs that records control,
data, and schedule dependencies using a Concur-
rent Provenance Graph (CPG) (§IV).
2• We implemented our algorithm as a dynamically
linkable shared library, which we call INSPEC-
TOR, leveraging MMU-assisted memory tracking,
process-level isolation, and Intel PT ISA extensions.
The INSPECTOR library can be loaded and linked at
run-time as a replacement to the pthreads library,
without any recompilation of the application code
(§V).
• We further extended the library to support a live
snapshot facility, where the user can analyze the
provenance on-the-fly while the program is still
running. The library periodically takes a consistent
snapshot [15] of the CPG in a decentralized fashion
(§VI).
We empirically demonstrate the effectiveness of IN-
SPECTOR by applying it to applications of PARSEC [12]
and Phoenix [36] benchmark suites. Our experiments
show that INSPECTOR incurs reasonable overhead to
record data provenance for a majority of applications
(§VII).
Furthermore, we briefly describe three on-going
projects where the generic provenance interface exported
by INSPECTOR is being used to improve the dependabil-
ity, security, and efficiency of software systems (§VIII).
INSPECTOR is an active open-source project and the
library is publicly available to the research community
for further use in other workflows.
II. OVERVIEW
Our approach targets a shared-memory multithreaded
environment, in which threads parallelize computation
and take advantage of shared portions of the address
space to efficiently communicate with each other. Apart
from performing reads and writes to the shared memory,
threads also employ different types of synchronization
mechanisms to co-ordinate their progress, thereby en-
suring correct semantics.
We base our design on POSIX threads, commonly
referred to as pthreads, which is a widely used thread-
ing library for shared-memory multithreading with a
rich set of synchronization primitives. This choice has
several advantages, namely that the POSIX interface is
standardized across different architectures and operating
systems. Furthermore, pthreads is used as the underly-
ing threading library for many higher level abstractions
for parallel programming (e.g., OpenMP). Therefore, our
design choice benefits a lot of existing applications.
Basic approach. At a high level, we record data prove-
nance for a multithreaded execution by constructing a
Concurrent Provenance Graph (or CPG). Informally, the
CPG records three types of dependencies; namely, con-
trol, data, and schedule dependencies for the multi-
threaded execution. To record these dependencies, we di-
vide thread execution into sub-computations. We record
the execution trace to construct the CPG that tracks
the data flow between the sub-computations, control flow
for each thread execution, and threads interleaving or
schedule dependency in the multithreaded execution.
More specifically, the Concurrent Provenance Graph
(or CPG) records a partial order O = (N,→) among sub-
computations with the following property: given a sub-
computation n (where n ∈ N) and the subset of sub-
computations M that precede it according to→, i.e., M =
{M ⊂ N | ∀m ∈ M, m → n}, if the writes made by m
becomes visible to n then the partial order → captures
this possible data flow between sub-computations.
Example. Using a simple example (shown in Figure 1),
we next explain how we record these dependencies
for a shared-memory multithreaded program. The ex-
ample considers a multithreaded execution with two
threads (T1 and T2) modifying two shared variables (x
and y) using a lock. In the example, we assume that
a thread execution is divided into sub-computations
at the boundaries of synchronization primitives, such
as lock()/unlock(). (We explain the reason behind
this design choice in §III.) We identify these sub-
computations as T1.a and T1.b for thread T1, and T2.a
for thread T2. To understand the dependencies that need
to be recorded for the required partial order (→), we
showcase three cases for recording the control, schedule,
and data dependencies.
The first dependency that we need to record is the
control flow execution of each thread. In particular, we
need to record the intra-thread execution order of sub-
computations. For example, sub-computation T1.b fol-
lows T1.a, and therefore, the control flow dependency
records this partial order as T1.a → T1.b. Additionally,
we need to record the control flow path taken within
a sub-computation. For example, sub-computation T1.a
has a conditional branch (if/else) based on the value
of flag. We supplement the control flow dependency
with all control paths taken by a thread within each sub-
computation; i.e., all branches taken at run-time.
Secondly, we need to record the inter-thread schedule
dependencies. The sub-computations can be interleaved
in different order across executions because of the non-
deterministic thread scheduling by the underlying OS.
For instance, when threads acquiring the lock in the
reverse order where thread T1.b gets acquire the lock
before T2.a. In this case, the final value of y is af-
fected based on this new ordering. Therefore, we also
need to record the schedule dependencies between sub-
computations as part of the partial order. We record
these schedule dependencies by tracking interleaving of
sub-computations by recording the thread schedule (For
example, T1.a→ T2.a→ T1.b).
Lastly, we need to record data dependencies between
sub-computations as a part of the partial order. For that,
we track read and write sets for each sub-computation,
i.e., the set of memory locations read or written by the
sub-computation, respectively. The data dependencies
3Thread 1 (T1) Thread 2 (T2)
/* T1 .a */ lock();
if (flag == 0)
read={y} x = ++y;
write={x, y} else
x = (++y) + 5;
unlock();
ց
lock(); /* T2 .a */
y = 2* x; read={x}
unlock(); write={y}
ւ
/* T1 .b */ lock();
read={y} y = y/2;
write={y} unlock();
Figure 1: An example of shared-memory multithreading.
are recorded implicitly using read and write-sets, and
the partial order recorded using the control and schedule
dependencies: if we know what data is read and written
by each sub-computation, we can determine whether a
data dependency exists by following the partial order,
i.e. if a sub-computation is transitively reading the data
that was modified by a sub-computation that precedes it
in the partial order→ then there exists a read-after-write
data dependency.
III. SYSTEM MODEL
Before we formally describe the provenance algorithm
(§IV), we first present the system model assumed by
INSPECTOR (§ III).
Memory consistency model. Our approach relies on the
use of the Release Consistency memory model (RC) [18],
which requires that all shared memory accesses are done
via synchronization primitives. This memory model re-
quires writes made by one thread to become visible
only to another thread after the first thread releases
a synchronization object and before the second thread
acquires a synchronization object. For our purposes,
this model has the critical benefit of allowing us to
restrict inter-thread communication (i.e. shared memory
accesses) to the synchronization points. By reducing the
number of points in an execution where inter-thread
communication can occur, we avoid having to track
individual load/store instructions, (given that any
of these accesses could potentially be inter-thread com-
munication), which would be extremely inefficient with
current hardware.
A natural consequence of the RC memory model
is that the granularity of sub-computations for prove-
nance in INSPECTOR is the sequence of instructions
between two pthreads API calls instead of individual
load/store instructions. Note that the RC memory
model is weaker than, for example, the Sequential Con-
sistency model (SC) [26], but still guarantees correctness
and liveness for applications that are data race free.
In fact, the semantics provided by INSPECTOR is as
restrictive as the POSIX specification [1], which man-
dates that all accesses to shared data structures must be
properly synchronized using pthreads synchronization
primitives.
Synchronization model. We support the full range of
synchronization primitives in the pthreads API, in-
cluding mutexes, cond wait/cond signal, semaphores, and
barriers. However, due to the weakly consistent RC
memory model, our approach does not support ad-
hoc synchronization mechanisms such as user-defined spin
locks. Although, ad-hoc synchronization mechanisms are
used due to either flexibility or performance reasons, in
practice they are shown to be error-prone introducing
bugs or severe performance issues [43].
IV. DESIGN
In this section, we first formally define the CPG
(§IV-A), and then present the algorithm to build the CPG
(§IV-B).
A. Concurrent Provenance Graph
We define the Concurrent Provenance Graph (CPG) as
a directed acyclic graph G = (V, E) with vertices
(V) and edges (E). The vertices of the CPG represent
sub-computations. The edges represent the dependen-
cies between the sub-computations. We distinguish be-
tween three kinds of edges: control, schedule, and data-
dependence edges for recording control, schedule, and
data dependencies, respectively.
Sub-computations. We define a sub-computation as the
sequence of instructions executed by a thread between
two pthreads synchronization API calls. Using the RC
memory model, we derive the synchronization and data
dependencies at the granularity of a sub-computation.
We further divide each sub-computation as sequence of
code thunks, or thunks to record the control path taken
by the executing thread within the sub-computation.
Dependencies. We distinguish between three kinds of
dependencies: control, synchronization, and data depen-
dencies. We next described these dependencies.
I: Control edges. Control edges are used to record the
intra-thread causal order between sub-computations of
the same thread based on their execution order. Fur-
thermore, we also record all control path taken by the
executing thread within each sub-computation during
the execution at the granularity of thunks.
We model the execution of thread t as a sequence of
sub-computations (Lt). Sub-computations in a thread are
totally ordered based on their execution order using a
monotonically increasing thunk counter (α). We refer a
sub-computation of thread t using the counter α as an
index in the thread execution sequence (Lt), i.e., Lt[α].
We refer a thunk (Lt[α].∆) as a sequence of instructions
between two successive branches within each subcom-
putation. We denote a thunk of sub-computation Lt[α]
4using a counter β as an index in the sub-computation as
Lt[α].∆[β].
II: Synchronization edges. Synchronization edges are used
to record the inter-thread causal order between sub-
computations based on the synchronization order be-
tween threads. We derive synchronization edges based
on the ordering of synchronization operations (also
known as a sync schedule). In particular, we build on
the observation that synchronization primitives can be
modeled as acquire and release operations. That is, during
synchronization, the synchronization object is released
by one set of threads and subsequently acquired by a
corresponding set of threads blocked on the object [17].
For example, an unlock(S) operation releases S and a
corresponding lock(S) operation acquires it. Likewise,
a global barrier(S) operation causes all threads to
release S as they reach the barrier, and then causes
them to re-acquire S. Similarly, all other synchronization
primitives can also be defined using acquire and release
operations [35], [17], which allows us discuss synchro-
nization only in terms of release and acquire operations.
We derive the partial order based on the happens-
before relation (→) [35], [17] between acquire and release
operations. In particular, a release operation happens-
before the corresponding acquire operation. Formally,
two sub-computations L(t1)[α1] and L(t2)[α2] are ordered
by the happens-before relationship (L(t1)[α1]→ L(t2)[α2])
if: (i) they are sub-computations of the same thread
(t1 = t2), and L(t1)[α1] was executed before L(t2)[α2];
(ii) L(t1)[α1] is a release and L(t2)[α2] is corresponding
acquire on the same synchronization object S; (iii) due
to transitivity if L(t1)[α1] → L(t3)[α3] and L(t3)[α3] →
L(t2)[α2].
III: Data-dependence edges. Data dependence edges
records the flow of data between sub-computations of
the same or different threads. We derive the data depen-
dencies between sub-computations using the read/write
sets, and recorded partial order in control and synchro-
nization edges. For a sub-computation Lt[α], the read-
set (Lt[α].R) and the write-set (Lt[α].W) are the set of
addresses that were respectively read from and written
to by the thread while executing the sub-computation.
Essentially, data dependence edges establish the
update-use relationship between sub-computations.
The update-use relationship exists between two sub-
computations if they can be ordered based on the
happens-before relationship, and the write-set of the
precedent sub-computations transitively intersects with
the read-set of the antecedent sub-computations.
B. Provenance Algorithm
At high-level, our algorithm records the multithreaded
execution to construct the CPG. Algorithm 1 presents the
overview of the provenance algorithm, and details of the
subroutines are presented in Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 1 Data provenance algorithm
∀S,∀i ∈ {1, ...,T} : CS[i]← 0; // All sync clocks set to zero
executeThread(t)
begin
initThread(t);
while t has not terminated do
startSub-computation(instruction);
repeat
Execute instruction of t;
if (instruction is load or store) then
onMemoryAccess(instruction);
end
if (instruction is branch then
onBranchAccess(instruction);
end
until t invokes synchronization primitive;
α ← α + 1; // Increment sub-computation counter
// Let S denote invoked synchronization primitive
onSynchronization(S);
end
end
Overview. The provenance algorithm (shown in Algo-
rithm 1) is executed by all threads in parallel. During a
thread execution, the thread traces memory accesses on
load/store instructions, and adds them to the read
and the write set of the executing sub-computation for
deriving data dependencies. Additionally, the executing
thread traces all branch instructions, and adds this in-
formation for thunks of the executing sub-computation
to record control dependencies. The thread continues
to execute instructions until a synchronization primitive
call is made to the pthreads library. At the synchro-
nization point, we define the end point for the executing
sub-computation. Thereafter, we let the thread perform
the actual synchronization operation. At synchroniza-
tion points, the algorithm derives control and synchro-
nization edges at the granularity of sub-computation
by recording the happens-before order between sub-
computations. Finally, we start a new sub-computation
and repeat the process until the executing thread termi-
nates.
Details. For the CPG, control and synchronization de-
pendencies are derived by happens-before ordering
of sub-computations. To do so, we use vector clocks
(C) [30], a widely used mechanism to generate a partial
order of events and to infer causality. Our use of vector
clocks is motivated by its efficiency for recording a
partial order between sub-computations in a complete
decentralized manner instead of having to serialize all
synchronization events in a total order.
In particular, each thread maintains a vector clock, i.e.,
an array/vector of size equal to the number of threads in
the system. During a synchronization event, the clock of
the thread performing the acquire operation is updated
based on the clock value of the thread performing the
release operation. More precisely, the vector clock is
updated as follows: if a thread t2 acquires the synchro-
nization object S released by a thread t1, then each entry
5Algorithm 2 Subroutines for the provenance algorithm
initThread(t)
begin
α ← 0; // Initializes sub-computation counter (α) to zero
∀i ∈ {1, ...,T} : Ct[i]← 0; // t’s clock set to zero
end
startSub-computation(instruction)
begin
β ← 0; // Initialize thunk counter
Lt[α].∆[β]← instruction; // Start new thunk
Ct[t]← α; // Update thread clock with sub-computation counter
(α) value
// Set sub-computation clock value to thread t’s clock
∀(i ∈ {1, ...,T}) : Lt [α].C[i]← Ct[i];
end
onMemoryAccess(instruction)
begin
// Update read/write sets of the executing sub-computation
if instruction is load then
Lt[α].R← Lt [α].R∪ {pageID}; // On read access
else
Lt[α].W← Lt[α].W ∪ {pageID}; // On write access
end
end
onBranchAccess(instruction)
begin
β ← β + 1; // Increment thunk counter
Lt[α].∆[β]← instruction; // Add a new thunk
end
onSynchronization(S)
begin
switch Syncronization type do
case release(S):
// Update S’s clock to hold max of its and t’s clocks
∀i ∈ {1, ...,T} : CS[i]← max(CS[i],Ct[i]);
sync(S); // Perform the synchronization
case acquire(S):
sync(S);
// Update t’s clock to hold max of its and S’s clocks
∀i ∈ {1, ...,T} : Ct[i]← max(CS[i],Ct[i]);
end
end
in t2’s vector is updated to hold the maximum of its old
value and the corresponding value of t1’s vector at the
moment of release.
To implement this mechanism, our algorithm main-
tains vector clocks for three kinds of entities: threads,
synchronization objects, and sub-computations. A thread
clock (Ct) for a thread t tracks the local logical time of the
thread, which is incremented each time a new thunk is
created. A synchronization clock (CS) for a synchronization
object S acts as a messaging medium between threads
synchronizing on S to update the thread clock. Finally,
a sub-computation clock (Lt[α].C) determines the position
of the sub-computation Lt[α] in the CPG, and is set to
the clock value of the thread while executing the sub-
computation .
Based on the intuition developed so far, we next
present the subroutines used in the recording algorithm
(see Algorithm 2). Let T denote the number of threads
in the system, which are numbered from 1 to T. Initially,
each thread t initializes (using routine initThread(t))
its monotonically increasing thunk counter (α) and the
thread clock (Ct) to zero. In addition, vector clocks (CS)
of all synchronization objects S are also initialized to
zero. In the beginning of a new thunk (using routine
startSub-computation()), the clock value (Ct) of
the thread t is updated based on the sub-computation
counter (α) to keep track of the local logical time of t. The
thread clock is updated by assigning the α to tth index
of the thread clock Ct[t]. The updated value of thread
clock (Ct) is also assigned to the sub-computation’s
clock (Lt[α].C). Finally, the read set and the write set
(Lt[Tt].R/W) of the new sub-computation are initialized
to empty set.
During a sub-computation execution, we trace reads
and writes (using routine onMemoryAccess()) at the
granularity of the memory pages (pageID), and update
the respective read/write set (Lt[Tt].R/W) of the execut-
ing sub-computation.
Similarly, we also trace branch instructions (using rou-
tine onBranchAccess()), and update the thunk within
the executing sub-computation.
At synchronization points, we define the end of the
current sub-computation, and therefore, we increment
the sub-computation counter (α) by one. The execut-
ing thread performs the synchronization operation (us-
ing routine onSynchronization()). Recall that in
our model, a synchronization operation is either a re-
lease or an acquire operation. Therefore, we handle
onSynchronization() accordingly. If it is a release
operation on the synchronization object S by the thread t,
the releasing thread updates the synchronization object’s
clock (CS) to hold the maximum of its own clock value
(Ct) and the clock (CS) of S. Then the releasing thread
performs the actual release operation on object S. Alter-
natively, if its an acquire operation then the acquiring
thread first performs the acquire operation on object
S. After the acquire operation on the synchronization
object S by thread t, the acquiring thread updates its
own clock (Ct) to hold the maximum of the clock value
(CS) of S and its own clock value (Ct). In this way, the
synchronization clock (CS) acts as a propagation medium
to pass the vector clock value from the thread doing the
release to the thread doing the acquire operation.
In the end of the provenance algorithm, all sub-
computations (along with their read/write sets) have
a recorded value of sub-computation’s vector clock
(Lt[α].C). The standard comparison of vector clocks de-
fines the happens-before partial order, through which
causal order is derived between sub-computations.
V. IMPLEMENTATION
This section describes the architecture and implemen-
tation of INSPECTOR. We implemented INSPECTOR as a
dynamically linkable shared library for the GNU/Linux
OS that can be loaded and linked at runtime for POSIX
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threads (replacing the pthreads library). The applica-
tion executables can simply link the library (without
any recompilation) either using LD_PRELOAD or the
-rdynamic flag, specifying the path of the INSPECTOR
library. The INSPECTOR library exports the CPG as an
extended interface in the perf utility for supporting
data provenance. The architecture of INSPECTOR (shown
in Figure 2) consists of two main components: threading
library (§V-A) and OS support for Intel PT (§V-B). We
next describe these two components in detail.
A. Threading Library
The threading library derives the data and schedule
dependencies. The architecture of the threading library
is shown in Figure 3.
Memory protection. A central challenge of the imple-
mentation of the algorithm is keeping track of the data
dependencies for shared-memory accesses by all possible
interleaving threads. Since monitoring every load and
store to each memory word would be too costly, we in-
stead rely on the OS’s (hardware-assisted) segmentation
fault mechanism to keep track of reads and writes at the
granularity of memory pages.
To derive the read and write sets during sub-
computation execution, INSPECTOR uses standard mem-
ory protection mechanism and signal handlers. In par-
ticular, INSPECTOR protects the address space using
mprotect(PROT_NONE) at the beginning of each sub-
computation. This forces a trap (and the corresponding
OS signal) the first time a page is read or written to in
a given sub-computation. The respective signal handler,
which is implemented by the INSPECTOR library, records
the information about the access, and also resets the
protection bits so that subsequent accesses to the same
page by the same thread in the same sub-computation
can proceed without generating a trap.
However, a naive page protection mechanism raises an
important problem because all threads in a process share
the same virtual memory structures (namely the TLB and
page table entries with the respective protection bits).
This makes it difficult to keep track of which threads
are responsible for which memory accesses or to enforce
different protections for different threads. Otherwise, we
need to re-protect the page after serving every load and
store instruction causing a large number of segmentation
faults. To address this problem, INSPECTOR implements
threads as separate processes (an idea proposed by
Grace [4] and Dthreads [28]).
Data and 
schedule 
dependencies
Application 
Memory management 
MMU
Trap
Page fault
Inspector-library.so
mprotect
Shared-memory mapped file
Thread #1
as a process
Thread #2
as a processShared-memory 
commit
Perf
Figure 3: Architecture of the threading library.
Threads as processes. INSPECTOR implements threads
as separate processes thus allowing each thread has
its own private address space and control over the
virtual memory structures. This gives us the ability to
manipulate the page protection of threads individually
while providing a simple way to implement the release
consistency memory model. In particular, INSPECTOR
uses the clone system call to fork off a new process
on pthread_create(). The process that implements
the newly created thread (i.e., the child process) already
shares parts of the execution context with the parent
process (which implements the calling thread) such as
file descriptors and signal handlers.
But this raises a new problem, which is that, unlike
threads, processes do not share their address spaces. We
address this by taking advantage of the RC memory
model we defined for INSPECTOR, where threads share
the updates only at synchronization points.
Shared memory commit. To implement the RC memory
model, we use shared memory commit (originally pro-
posed in distributed shared memory architectures such
as TreadMarks [23] and Munin [14]) that allows threads
to communicate at well-defined synchronization points.
Our shared memory commit is implemented using mem-
ory mapped files. In particular, the virtual address
ranges for the shared portions (globals and heap) of
the address space are mapped to memory mapped files,
which are managed by the INSPECTOR library. These
address ranges correspond to the heap and the static
(i.e., globals) regions. During thread creation, INSPECTOR
marks these address ranges as a private copy-on-write
mapping (using MAP_PRIVATE in mmap()). The effect
of this is that whenever the child thread tries to write
to a memory location, the OS makes a thread-private
copy of the memory page containing the modification.
At synchronization points, the thread computes a diff for
each dirty page by performing a byte-level comparison
between the dirty page and the shared page. The deltas
are then atomically copied to the shared memory page;
if there are overlapping writes to the same memory
location we resolve them using a last-writer wins policy.
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Input support. In addition to providing wrappers for
pthreads and malloc related API calls, we also imple-
mented shim layer for a number of input glibc library
calls to record the data-flow from the input. For instance,
we provide wrappers for mmap for reading the input. In
particular, the threading library differentiates between
the mmap calls made by the library itself and the target
application. This allows us to record the mapping of the
input file in the input address space. And, as described
before, the library uses mprotect() to derive the data
flow from the input.
B. OS Support for Intel PT
To obtain the control flow dependencies, we use Intel
Processor Trace (PT) ISA extensions. We next present
the implementation details of the OS support for Intel
PT, recently released as part of the Broadwell (also in
Skylake) micro-architecture.
Intel Processor Trace (Intel PT). Intel PT is an exten-
sion of Intel Architecture that logs information about
software execution with minimal performance impact.
The processor collects information such as control flow,
execution modes and timings and formats it into highly
compressed binary packets. Traditionally, Intel archi-
tectures provided Branch Trace Store (BTS) for tracing
branch execution. However, BTS was slow and impre-
cise. Therefore, it was not adopted in practice. To over-
come the limitations of BTS, Intel recently introduced PT
ISA extensions as part of the Broadwell (also available
in Skylake) micro-architecture.
OS support. The Intel PT tracing facility is integrated
into the operating system, which makes it possible to
use different trace buffers for different processes, and
to make the facility available for non-root users. In
Linux this processor feature is exposed to the user-space
as a Performance Measuring Unit (PMU) in the perf
event interface. We make use of the Intel PT PMU to
derive the control flow dependencies. Figure 4 shows
the architecture for the OS support for Intel PT.
In particular, the perf interface on Linux consists
of a syscall, which gives back a file descriptor. Events
are accessed by obtaining buffers via mmap(2) and can
be further controlled via ioctl() syscall on the given
file descriptor. Along with interface the user-space perf
allows to dump and filter from these buffers. In our
case, this filtering is done by using Linux control groups
(also known as cgroups). cgroups is a kernel feature
to apply constraint like resource usage to a group of
processes. It has the property, that by default every child
process belongs to the same process as its parent. Also
for perf_events such a cgroup exists.
We create such a cgroup exclusively for the ap-
plication using INSPECTOR. This is done because our
threading library causes applications using threads to
create multiple processes instead, whose process ids are
not known in advance.
The subcommand perf record is then used to
dump the trace produced by Intel PT. Intel PT generates
a stream of TNT packets, which denotes the conditional
branches taken and TIP packets for indirect branches
and function returns. The data is referenced as a sam-
ple event in the perf event list and stored in a ring
buffer called AUX area. If perf tool cannot keep up with
processor trace it is possible (for example an interrupt
occurs), there will be gaps in the trace. (We provide a
snapshot facility (§VI) to overcome this limitation.)
After execution the result can be further processed
by using a set of tools for example perf script.
The branch information is still in a compressed form
and needs to be decoded. We make use of the Intel
Processor Decoder Library for Intel PT that is integrated
in the perf utility. To map the trace onto binaries, it
needs access to executables and linked libraries of the
application. For that, we track mmap events to know
the location of each loadable during the execution.
Along with Intel PT, the page fault events generated
by the kernel will be included additionally to the trace
packets. Because our threading library uses mprotect
syscall to monitor access of heap and global memory
space, whenever the application access this memory,
the MMU will generate a page fault. These page faults
also include the location, where in code memory was
accessed.
VI. SNAPSHOT MECHANISM
An additional challenge that we need to address in
the implementation of INSPECTOR is to deal with the
excessive log data produced by Intel PT, especially for
long running applications. Therefore, we further extend
the library to support a live snapshot facility, where the
user (or an application using INSPECTOR) can analyze
the provenance on-the-fly while the program is still
running. Thus, the snapshot facility provides a practical
alternative to restrict the space overheads imposed for
storing the CPG.
For the snapshot facility, the library periodically takes
a consistent cut of the CPG. A cut is consistent if, for
any synchronization operation on object S in the trace,
acquire(S) operation being in the cut implies that corre-
sponding release(S) is also included in the cut [15]. To
achieve so, we make use of modeling synchronization
8primitives as acquire and release operations (described
in §IV). Each thread invokes the snapshot operation on
the latest synchronization event (acquire or release) in the
recorded trace.
We implemented the consistent cut facility using Intel
PT interface for perf, which provides mechanism for
the full trace, and a snapshot mode. When the full trace
is enabled then the kernel does not overwrite the data
that the user-space has not collected yet. This results
in gaps in the trace, if the user-space process is not
fast enough in collecting the log data. Whereas, in the
snapshot mode, however, the old data in this ring buffer
is constantly overwritten so that an application can start
and stop tracing around a certain event. The perf tool
exposes this feature by installing a handler on signal
SIGUSR2, which triggers the start of a trace. INSPECTOR
makes use of the signal and forwards it to perf to
record a consistent snapshot of the trace based on the
aforementioned checkpointing mechanism. Using this
signal, we implemented a simple ring buffer with a
configurable number of slots (each slot size is set to
4MB). As the user (or the application using INSPECTOR)
finishes the live analysis on the recorded snapshots of the
CPG, we reuse those slots for storing the new incoming
snapshots of the CPG.
VII. EVALUATION
In this section, we present an experimental evaluation
of INSPECTOR based on the implementation described in
§V. Our evaluation answers the following questions.
• What performance overheads does INSPECTOR im-
pose for recording the provenance graph? (§VII-B)
• What are the sources for these overheads? (§VII-C)
• How do these overheads scale with increase in the
size of the input data? (§VII-D)
• What are the space overheads for the CPG? (§VII-E)
A. Experimental Setup
Experimental platform. We used an Intel Xeon proces-
sor based on Broadwell micro-architecture as our host
machine. The host system consists of 8 cores (16 hyper-
threads) of Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU Processor D-1540 (12M
Cache, 2.00 GHz) and 32 GB of DRAM main memory.
The host machine is running Linux with kernel 4.3.0 in
64-bit mode.
Applications and dataset. We evaluated INSPECTOR
using applications from two multithreaded benchmark
suites: Phoenix 2.0 [36] and PARSEC 3.0 [12]. Table 7
lists the applications used for the evaluation along with
the input data and benchmark parameters.
Performance metrics: Time and Work. For each run, we
consider two types of measures: time and work. Time
refers to the amount of (end-to-end) run-time to com-
plete the parallel computation. Work refers to the total
amount of computation performed by all threads and is
measured as the overall CPUs utilization for all threads.
Both metrics are important and complementary: time
measurements reflect the end user perceived latency,
whereas work measurements assess the overall resource
(CPU) utilization.
Measurements. All applications were compiled using
GCC 5.2.1 compiler with -o3 optimization flag. For all
measurements, we report the average over 6 runs with
minimum and maximum values discarded (truncated
mean).
We measured work and time numbers for both
pthreads and INSPECTOR executions with the same
number of threads. For time measurements, we report
the run-time comparison between the native pthreads
execution, and INSPECTOR execution. To measure work,
we used the CPU accounting controller in cgroups to
account the CPU usage of all threads.
Finally, the log produced by perfwas written to /tmp
on tmpfs to allow high throughput.
B. Performance Overheads for Data Provenance
First, we explain the provenance overheads imposed
by INSPECTOR w.r.t. the native pthreads execution.
Figure 5 shows the provenance overheads of INSPECTOR
w.r.t. the native pthreads execution with varying num-
ber of threads (from 2 to 16 threads). As expected, the
provenance overheads increases with the increase in the
number of threads. This is because the shared memory
commit (§V-A) takes longer time with a higher number
of threads, as each thread spends less time computing
on the input data.
The experiment shows that the provenance overheads
using INSPECTOR vary across applications. We observe
that a majority of applications (9/12) have a reasonable
overhead between 1× up to 2.5× w.r.t. the native exe-
cution. However, three applications have exceptionally
high overheads: canneal, reverse index, and kmeans. The
high overheads is explained as follows: canneal modifies
a lot of memory pages that leads to a high number of
page faults for deriving read and write sets (see Table 7).
Whereas, reverse index does a lot of small memory allo-
cations across threads leading to a large number of seg-
mentation faults. Finally, kmeans creates more than 400
threads until the clusters co-efficient converges, when we
specify 500 as the parameter for the iterative convergence
algorithm (see Table 7). Since, creating a process takes
more time than creating a thread, we see a slowdown in
kmeans.
On the other hand, linear regression performs better
than pthreads, which is explained by the fact that our
implementation of threads as processes (§V) avoids false
sharing, as previously noted by Sheriff [27], which leads
to improved performance.
Lastly, in the case of streamcluster, we were limited
by our physical memory to store the log in tmpfs for
9(a) Time overheads (b) Work overheads
Figure 5: Performance overheads of INSPECTOR over native execution with increasing number of threads.
(a) Time overhead breakdown (b) Work overhead breakdown
Figure 6: Performance overhead breakdown with 16 threads — except for streamcluster, where the breakdown for
15 threads is shown.
16 threads (see §VII-E). Therefore, we also show the
overheads with 14 and 15 threads, where the provenance
log can fit into the main memory. To better understand
the breakdown of provenance, we chose 15 threads for
streamcluster in §VII-C.
C. Performance Overheads Breakdown
Next, we investigated the breakdown of the prove-
nance overheads. Recall that our system implementation
has two major components: (1) the threading library
(§V-A), and (2) the OS support for Intel PT (§V-B).
Figure 6 shows the breakdown of overheads with 16
threads normalized to the native pthreads execution.
We quantify the breakdown as the time taken by the
threading library and the OS support for Intel PT. The
result shows an interesting pattern: the applications
with unreasonably high overheads (canneal, reverse index,
and kmeans) spend a majority of time in the threading
library for the above mentioned reasons. Whereas, the
overheads for tracing the control flow due to Intel PT is a
dominant factor for the other applications. These results
highlight that for a majority of applications (9/12) the
underlying hardware is still a bottleneck to achieve low
provenance overheads.
D. Scalability with the Input Data
In addition to scalability w.r.t. threads, we also mea-
sured the performance overheads with increase in the
size of the input data. For that, we report the perfor-
mance overheads for four applications that are avail-
able with three input sizes: small (S), medium (M),
and large (L). These four applications are: histogram,
linear regression, string match, and word count.
In this experiment, we kept the number of threads to
a constant (16 threads), and we varied the input sizes
for these applications. Figure 8 shows the results for
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Application Dataset / Parameters Page faults Faults/sec
blackscholes 16 in 64K.txt prices.txt 2.49E+04 2.58E+04
canneal 15 10000 2000 100000.nets 32 2.11E+06 21.57E+04
histogram large.bmp 4.27E+04 10.78E+04
kmeans -d 3 -c 500 -p 50000 -s 500 1.16E+06 13.99E+04
linear regression key file 500MB.txt 2.88E+04 11.11E+04
matrix multiply 2000 2000 2.32E+05 11.65E+04
pca -r 4000 -c 4000 -s 100 5.34E+05 10.22E+04
reverse index datafiles 2.61E+04 10.35E+04
streamcluster 2 5 1 10 10 5 none output.txt 16 1.64E+05 1.163E+04
string match key file 500MB.txt 3.11E+04 1.993E+04
swaptions -ns 128 -sm 50000 -nt 16 4.66E+04 1.207E+04
word count word 100MB.txt 1.56E+05 54.34E+04
Figure 7: Runtime statistics for all benchmarks with 16 threads
our experiment. The bar plot shows the performance
overheads w.r.t. to the native pthreads execution on the
Y1-axis for three input sizes (S, M, L). For the reference,
the input sizes are also shown by a line plot in the same
figure on the Y2-axis.
The result shows that the gap between pthreads and
INSPECTOR narrows with bigger input sizes. This is due
to the fact that most applications use a data-parallel pro-
gramming design pattern for parallelization, where the
main threads divides the input data evenly between the
worker threads. As the input size increases, each thread
needs to perform more work (or compute on a larger
input size) than the time spent for synchronization. As a
result, each thread spends relatively more time outside
the shared-memory commit to compute on the data, and
thus, it results in improved performance.
E. Space Overheads for the Provenance Graph
Finally, we present the space overhead for storing
the provenance graph. A major limitation of using Intel
PT is that it produces a large amounts of trace data.
Furthermore, the threading library also produces trace
data to record the data and schedule dependencies.
Table 9 shows the space overhead for all applications
with 16 threads.
The space overheads vary across applications: it can
be as low as 183MB for linear regression and as high
as 29.3GB for streamcluster. The result shows a strong
correlation between the log bandwidth and branch in-
structions with a correlation coefficient of 0.89, which
was expected, because the log consists of taken branches.
Fortunately, the provenance log written by perf turns
out to be highly compressible. We were able to achieve
a compression ratio of between 6× and 37× times using
the lz4 compression algorithm. Furthermore, the snap-
shot facility (described in §VI) restricts the active area
of space usage, and the user can reuse the space in the
ring buffer after analyzing (or collecting) the provenance
graph.
VIII. DISCUSSION: CASE-STUDIES
While data provenance is useful across a wide range
of workflows, we discuss three active projects where
INSPECTOR is being used to increase the dependability,
security, and efficiency of software systems.
Dependability: Debugging programs [17]. Multi-
threaded programs are notoriously difficult to debug be-
cause of the inherent non-deterministic thread schedul-
ing by the OS. Currently, debugging techniques rely
on examining the memory state during the program
execution or by analyzing core dumps after the crash.
These techniques mainly target “what” is the state of
the program without revealing much about “why” is it
the state of the program is like that. Our library can be
extended to aid the developers to better understand the
failed execution by augmenting the existing debugging
techniques with the provenance of the memory state.
Security: Dynamic Information Flow Tracking
(DIFT) [37]. DIFT protects software against data leaks
by restricting the suspicious I/O calls. Our library
can be extended to support DIFT by carrying a taint
for the sensitive data as part of the provenance, and
restricting the output activities at the level of system
calls. In particular, a policy checker can analyze the
taint provenance to disallow sensitive data leaks. The
policy checker can be embedded at the level of glibc
wrappers for the output system calls. Note that we
currently target accidental or buggy, but not a malicious
threat model because our library is a user-space solution.
Efficiency: Memory management for NUMA [25]. The
recent advancement in NUMA architectures offers a
wide range of configurations for the interconnects with
varying memory bandwidth, and it is unclear how these
different configurations affect the OS support for mem-
ory management. Our library can be extended to inves-
tigate the potential impact of interconnect topologies on
memory management, and can be extended to optimize
the memory layout for a given interconnect topology.
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Figure 8: Scalability of overheads with increase in the input data sizes with 16 threads.
Provenance log details [MB] Bandwidth Branch instr.
Application Size Compressed Ratio [MB/sec] [Instr/sec]
blackscholes 851 57.3 15× 882 2.49E+09
canneal 5343 315.0 17× 547 1.55E+09
histogram 381 11.3 34× 961 4.17E+09
kmeans 11900 522.0 23× 1438 5.79E+09
linear regression 183 5.5 34× 707 3.81E+09
matrix multiply 2101 97.0 22× 105 4.05E+08
pca 1900 116.0 16× 364 1.42E+09
reverse index 192 5.7 34× 764 2.87E+09
streamcluster 29300 787.0 37× 2083 7.78E+09
string match 2751 430.0 6× 1763 5.61E+09
swaptions 7061 929.0 8× 1830 4.84E+09
word count 4121 508.0 8× 1435 2.80E+09
Figure 9: Space overheads for all benchmarks with 16 threads.
This optimization requires the memory access patterns
that could be easily derived from the CPG.
IX. RELATED WORK
Data provenance is a well-studied concept because
of it’s wide applicability in different complex computer
systems. Next, we review the related work from different
domains.
Database systems. Provenance has been shown to be im-
portant in databases for materialized views, probabilistic
databases, data integration, and curated databases (see a
survey paper for more details [13]). Almost, all existing
provenance work in databases leverages the explicit
database schema and structured layout of the input
records in tables to build the provenance graph, whereas,
INSPECTOR does not assume any structured layout of the
input data.
“Big Data” analytics. Data provenance is being in-
creasingly used in “big data” processing for debugging
complex workflows [32], [39], [40], [41], and also for
incremental computation [5], [6], [7], [9], [10], [11], [24].
These “big data” systems leverage the underlying task-
based programming model such as MapReduce [16]
or Dryad [22] for building the provenance graph. In
particular, these systems construct the provenance graph
based on the data-flow graph generated from the data-
parallel programming model. Instead of relying on the
constrained task-based programming model, INSPECTOR
derives the graph automatically for shared-memory mul-
tithreaded programs.
Distributed and network systems. Many distributed
and network systems propose provenance techniques for
tracing the execution of distributed protocols to provide
accountability, fault detection, forensics, verifiability, net-
work debugging, negative provenance [42], [44], [45],
[42]. To make the lineage secure in the presence of
adversaries in distributed settings, they further embed
techniques like tamper-proof logging [21] along lineage
for non-repudiability. These systems leverage the seman-
tics of distributed protocols to derive a state-machine,
and capture the lineage information by manually modi-
fying the state-machine. Instead, we do not require any
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protocol-specific state-machine. Albeit, we currently do
not support distributed systems.
Storage systems. Storage systems supporting prove-
nance collect meta-data of newly created objects in the
system (via the OS support), and maintain their lineage
information such as the chain of ownership and the
transformations performed on objects. In this context,
one of the most important line of work is Provenance-
Aware Storage Systems (PASS) that automates collection
and maintenance of provenance [31] of objects in the
system. In addition, PASS also supports queries, tracing
the lineage of objects, upon the provenance data. In
contrast to PASS that tracks objects in storage systems,
our focus is on tracing the lineage of shared-memory
accesses in multithreaded programs at the granularity
of memory pages. Like PASS, we also rely on the OS
support for tracking of memory pages.
Memory tracing. Our approach is complementary to
numerous run-time [33] and compile-time [29] tools that
allow fine-grained byte-level memory read and writes
made by threads. In contrast, our tool makes a trade-off
of memory tracking at the granularity of memory pages,
and uses a combination of OS support and the new ISA
extensions to track the data flow for the entire program.
Furthermore, we also record control and schedule de-
pendencies for the multithreaded execution as part of
the data provenance graph.
Operating systems. Linux Provenance Module (LPM) [3]
provides OS support to collect system-wide provenance.
In contrast to LPM, INSPECTOR is a user-space solution
and does not require any modifications to the underlying
OS. Secondly, unlike LPM, which collects provenance at
the granularity of a process, we collect data provenance
at a finer granularity of a thread. On the other hand,
LPM benefits from the integrated OS approach to secure
the provenance information.
Programming languages. Programming languages re-
searchers develop language-based provenance ap-
proaches relying on a new language with special
data-types. These language-based approaches derive
the provenance graph using techniques such as self-
adjusting computation [2]. In contrast, our work
supports existing programs without relying on any
language-level support or a new type system.
X. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we presented INSPECTOR, a data prove-
nance library for multithreaded programs. Our approach
targets existing executables, relies on OS-specific mech-
anisms and new ISA extensions of Intel PT to efficiently
build the Concurrent Provenance Graph (CPG). The CPG
records control, data, and schedule dependencies for the
shared-memory multithreaded program execution. Our
solution is straightforward to deploy: it simply replaces
the pthreads library, allowing existing applications
to benefit from our approach with no re-compilation
or code changes. INSPECTOR’s source code is publicly
available for further use in a wide-range of workflows
for data provenance. The original paper of INSPECTOR
is available onine [38].
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